Rule compliance is crucial for the effective functioning and cohesion of communities and organisations. In this paper, I investiagte whether the identity of the rule-setter influences rule-following behaviour in an experimental setting. Participants first engage in a collective in-person task to foster a sense of group identity, followed by an individual rule-following task. Between two treatments, I vary the rule-setter’s identity: in the in-group rule treatment, participants are informed that the rule was set by an in-group member, while in the out-group rule treatment, they are told it was set by an out-group member. Results show that, while the in-person interaction successfully generates group identity, this group identification does not translate into higher rule compliance.

This study investigates how cooperation in small groups is affected by endogenous institutional choice. Specifically, it compares cooperative behaviour when the rules are chosen by group members using direct democracy, where participants vote directly, or indirect democracy, which involves electing a group representative. A laboratory experiment was conducted with two treatments: direct democracy and indirect democracy. In the direct democracy treatment, cooperation under a rule chosen endogenously by group members is compared with cooperation under the identical exogenously imposed rule. Similarly, in the indirect democracy treatment, cooperation under indirect democracy is compared with cooperation under a rule externally determined. Contrary to some prior findings in the literature, the paper reports no evidence supporting a democracy premium associated with endogenous choice of institutions. Notably, both direct and indirect democracy premia are found to be statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the results reveal no statistically significant difference between the direct and indirect democracy premia. 

Communication is often an effective method for resolving coordination problems and conflicts. However, there are situations where communication alone has limited impact and fails to improve overall outcomes. This study investigates a commonly used mechanism in practice: the introduction of an impartial third party, a “mediator,” into the conversation. We conducted a laboratory experiment to examine whether such a third party can enhance outcomes. In the baseline treatment, two players freely chat before playing a Chicken game. In the third-party communication treatment, a third player, acting as a mediator, joins the chat but does not participate in the Chicken game itself, only in the communication stage. The results indicate that in our setting, third-party communication does not help to improve outcomes in terms of average payoffs and satisfaction with the outcome.