Rule compliance is crucial for the effective functioning and cohesion of communities and organisations. In this paper, I investiagte whether the identity of the rule-setter influences rule-following behaviour in an experimental setting. Participants first engage in a collective in-person task to foster a sense of group identity, followed by an individual rule-following task. Between two treatments, I vary the rule-setter’s identity: in the in-group rule treatment, participants are informed that the rule was set by an in-group member, while in the out-group rule treatment, they are told it was set by an out-group member. Results show that, while the in-person interaction successfully generates group identity, this group identification does not translate into higher rule compliance.

This study investigates how cooperation in groups is affected by endogenous institutional choice. Specifically, it compares cooperative behavior under direct democracy, where the rule is chosen by group members themselves, and indirect democracy, where group members elect a representative who sets the rule. I conduct a laboratory experiment with two treatments: direct democracy and indirect democracy. In each treatment, I compare cooperation under an endogenously chosen rule with cooperation under an identical exogenously imposed rule. Contrary to previous findings that endogenous institutional choice enhances cooperation, I find no evidence of a democracy premium. Cooperation rates under endogenously chosen rules do not differ significantly from those under exogenously imposed rules in either direct or indirect democracy. Furthermore, I find no statistically significant difference between the direct and indirect democracy premia.

Communication is often an effective method for resolving coordination problems and conflicts. However, there are situations where communication alone has limited impact and fails to improve overall outcomes. This study investigates a commonly used mechanism in practice: the introduction of an impartial third party into the conversation. We conducted a laboratory experiment to examine whether such a third party can enhance outcomes. In the baseline treatment, two players freely chat before playing a Chicken game. In the third-party communication treatment, a third player, acting as a mediator, joins the chat but does not play the game. The results indicate that, in our setting, third-party communication does not help to improve outcomes in terms of average payoffs, coordination on equilibria, or satisfaction with the outcome.